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This paper introduces two composite indices of globalization. The first is based on the 
Kearney/Foreign Policy magazine and the second is obtained from principal component 
analysis. They indicate the level of globalization and show how globalization has developed 
over time for different countries. The indices are composed of four components: economic 
integration, personal contact, technology and political engagement, each generated from a 
number of indicators. A breakdown of the index into major components provides 
possibilities to identify the sources of globalization at the country level and associate it with 
economic policy measures. The empirical results show that a low rank in the globalization 
process is due, in addition to involvement in conflicts, to economic and technology factors 
with limited possibility for the developing countries to affect. The high ranked developed 
countries share similar patterns in distribution of various components. The indices were also 
used in a regression analysis to study the causal relationships between income inequality, 
poverty and globalization. The results show evidence of a weak and negative relationship 
between globalization and income inequality and poverty. 
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1 Introduction   
Globalization1 has become the way to describe changes in international economy and in 
world politics. Economists define it as the free movement of goods, services, labour and 
capital across borders. Globalization is the result of reduced transportation and 
communication costs, lower trade barriers, faster communication, rising capital flows, 
increased competition, standardization, and migration to mention, a few key causal 
factors. The process has brought the developed economies closer together and made 
them more strongly interrelated. In the new era of growing integration of economies and 
societies, individuals and corporations reach around the world further, faster, and more 
economically than before. This subjects states and individuals to more intense 
developed market forces by causing rapid changes in trade relations, financial flows, 
and the mobility of labour across the world. However, there is a large heterogeneity in 
the degree of the process of globalization over time and across countries and regions as 
well as within countries across cohorts and skill groups. This heterogeneity causes 
disparity in development, especially with regard to negative effects such as rising 
inequality within and between countries, and points to the need to find the sources of 
disparity and to quantify its magnitude and impacts on the living conditions of the world 
population. 
In recent years, theoretical research on the link between globalization and world 
inequality and poverty has been intense. However, comprehensive analysis of the link at 
the empirical level is scarce. Globalization generally is expected to reduce poverty 
through faster growth in more integrated economies. Extensive empirical research on 
the causal connections between globalization and inequality in developing nations 
during the pre-globalization phase shows that there is no structural relationship between 
growth and inequality, and income inequality levels were generally immobile and 
trendless. Despite the great importance placed in the recent decade on the globalization 
process, its sources, channels and consequences remain poorly understood. The 
channels through which globalization affects world inequality have been identified as 
commodity price equalization, factor price convergence, capital mobility and 
differentials in marginal products and rates of return of capital among countries, and 
dynamic convergence of per capita income growth.  
The objective of this study is to investigate the usefulness of the two indices of 
globalization (Kearney and principal component analysis based) to compare a large 
sample of industrialized, transition and developing countries on the basis of their 
integration in the world economy. The two indices are based on the countries’ economic 
integration, personal contact, technology and political engagement. A decomposition of 
the indices into underlying four distinct components quantifies the individual factors’ 
contribution to the integration. This attempt to analyse the very diverse aspects of 
globalization and subsequently the different channels through which it can have effects 
is a significant contribution to the existing analysis. In addition to investigating the 
international level of globalization, the indices are used for between- and within-region 
comparisons. The indices are expected to serve as useful tools in the evaluation of the 
impact of globalization on the welfare of nations and regions. They are used in 
                                                 
1  Sklair (1999) and Woods (1998) discuss competing conceptions, main approaches to, definitions, 
debates and implications of globalization.   
regression analysis to study the causal relationship between income inequality, poverty 
and globalization.  
The results suggest that the construction of the index and its breakdown into several 
distinct components to be useful. However, very little of the variance in inequality and 
poverty outcomes can be explained by the globalization that operates through these four 
channels. It is important to recognize what happens across the various channels at the 
country level and to understand their interaction.2 For instance, certain within-country 
factors such as institutions and weak governance structure seem to explain much of the 
variance. Therefore, initial endowments and how countries integrate into the 
international economy determine the distributional effects of globalization. Aggregate 
static measures such as Gini coefficient fail to capture many of the distributional shifts 
that result from the opening of trade and capital markets. Graham (2005) suggests that 
more disaggregated measures are needed to account for distributional shifts and such 
phenomena as economics of happiness which are not captured by money metric 
measures within cohorts and across skill groups and regions. 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the literature on the different 
perspectives of globalization, the links between globalization and inequality and 
poverty, and measures to reduce its negative impacts are reviewed. In section 3 the 
Kearney and principal component composite indices of globalization are introduced. 
The data are described in section 4. Results based on the variations in the two 
globalization indices, the ranking of countries and regions by the degree of 
globalization, and the development of globalization over time are discussed in section 5. 
Results from regression analyses of the impacts of globalization on income inequality 
and poverty are discussed in sections 6 and 7, respectively. Section 8 summarizes the 
findings.      
2  A review of the literature 
Globalization has its roots in the second-half of the eighteenth century. The period 
1870-2000 is classified into (i) the first wave of globalization 1870-1913, (ii) the 
de-globalization period of 1913-50, (iii) the golden age of 1950-73, and (iv) the second 
wave of globalization from 1973 onwards (see O’Rourke and Williamson 2000; 
O’Rourke 2001; Maddison 2001; Williamson 2002; and World Bank 2002). Empirical 
evidence shows that during the first wave of globalization, convergence in per capita 
income and real wages took place within the Atlantic economy. The de-globalization 
period is characterized by a widening disparity between the richest and poorest regions 
as well as within the Atlantic economy. The golden age was a period of rapid growth, 
relative stability and declining inequality. For more details see also Solimano (2001).  
A vast amount of literature on various aspects of the recent wave of globalization is 
developing. Several special issues on globalization have been published in Oxford 
Development Studies, Journal of World-Systems Research and the Journal of African 
Economies. Editorial introductions to these special issues are provided by Woods 
(1998); Manning (1999); Bergesen and Bata (2002a, 2002b); and Bevan and Fosu 
(2003). In addition, a number of books on the issue have been published. Dollar and 
                                                 
2  I thank Carol Graham for making this point.  
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Collier (2001) and the World Bank (2002) explore the relationship between 
globalization, growth and poverty; James (2002) analyses technology, globalization and 
poverty, while Aghion and Williamson (1998) examine the relationship between 
globalization, growth and inequality, while Khan and Riskin (2001), focusing on history 
and policies, limit their study to the development in China. O’Rourke and Williamson 
(2000) look at the evolution of the nineteenth century Atlantic economy, and Tausch 
and Herrmann (2002) analyse globalization and European integration. 
2.1  The links between globalization and inequality 
In recent years, research on the link between globalization and world inequality has 
been intense. Economic growth has often been given priority as an anti-poverty 
measure, while the negative links between growth and inequality have been largely 
ignored by policymakers. Cornia and Court (2001), in a policy brief covering the second 
wave of globalization, highlight five main issues. First, inequality has risen since the 
early-mid 1980s. Second, the traditional common factors causing inequality—such as 
land concentration, urban bias and inequality in education—are not responsible for 
worsening the situation. Third, the persistence of inequality at high levels makes 
poverty reduction difficult. Fourth, a high level of inequality can depress the rate of 
growth (see also Birdsall 2000). Fifth, developments in Canada and Taiwan show that 
low inequality can be maintained at a fast growth rate. The non-traditional new causes 
of inequality are identified as liberal economic policy regimes and the way in which 
economic reform policies have been carried out. Traditional factors such as land reform, 
expanding education and active regional policy are recommended as measures to reduce 
inequality. The new development approach called the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ 
(Stiglitz 1998) includes measures to offset the negative impacts of new technologies and 
trade, macroeconomic stability, financial liberalization  and regulation by suggesting 
innovative tax and transfer policies.  
In their studies of the link between globalization and inequality, Lindert and Williamson 
(2001) and O’Rourke (2001) state that increased world inequality has been driven by 
between-country rather than within-country inequality. It follows, therefore, that 
globalization will have very different implications for within-country inequality. The 
direction of impact on within-country inequality depends on the participating country’s 
policy to exploit it. Instead of globalization, the source of within-country inequality in 
the lagging countries can be poor governance and non-democracy. In their conclusions, 
Lindert and Williamson (2001) classify the influence of globalization on inequality into 
five observations. First, the widening income gaps between countries integrating into 
the world economy probably have been reduced. Second, within labour-abundant 
countries, emigration and the opening up to international trade before 1914 did lower 
inequality. Third, within labour-scarce countries, immigration and the opening up to 
international trade raised inequality. Fourth, accounting for all international and intra-
national effects, a greater degree of globalization has reduced inequality. Fifth, with the 
integration of countries and economies, inequality has become lower than under 
segmentation.  
Among other studies linking inequality and globalization are Talbot (2002) who argues 
that a new international inequality has been superimposed on the old form of 
international inequality, and that this factor, by referring to transnational corporations’ 
control over capital, explains the increasing global inequality. Bergesen and Bata 
(2002a, 2002b) summarize that the increasing international inequality was one of the  
most important consequences of the nineteenth century globalization. Babones (2002) 
finds evidence of  increasing between-nation inequality since the mid-twentieth century. 
Beer and Boswell (2002) link increased within-nation inequality to greater dependency 
on foreign investment. Bornschier (2002) observes stable inequality until 1972, but 
increasing inequality both within and between nations upto the end of the century. 
Bergesen and Bata (2002) find that among core countries, the within- and between-
nation inequality changes in parallel over time, but that they are unrelated among non-
core countries.      
2.2  The link between globalization and poverty 
Agénor (2003) examines the extent to which globalization affects the poor in 
developing countries. The focus is on the channels through which trade openness and 
financial integration may have adverse effects on poverty. In cross-country regression 
analysis, globalization is related to poverty and Agénor controls for various 
macroeconomic and structural variables. The results suggest evidence of an inverted 
U-shape relationship between globalization and poverty, indicating that globalization at 
low (higher) levels tends to increase (reduce) poverty. However, Collier and Dollar 
(2001) estimate that poverty in the developing countries will decline by about one-half 
by 2015. The reduction is contingent on the trend of the 1990s being stable, an 
improvement in aid effectiveness in lagging regions, the quality of economic policy, and 
significant policy reforms in these countries to create a better environment for poverty 
reduction and effective aid. Inefficiency in aid makes the achievements of the poverty 
reduction goals uncertain. In a comparison of actual aid allocation and poverty-efficient 
aid allocation, Collier and Dollar (2002) find that the level of poverty and the quality of 
policies do matter. The results are not sensitive to poverty measures, but the authors find 
a systematic difference between actual and poverty-efficient aid allocations.  
The World Bank Development Research Group (2002) focuses on the impact of 
economic integration on the poor living in developing countries. Three main findings 
linked to the globalization debate are presented. First, poor countries like China, India, 
Bangladesh and Vietnam, which were early exporters of primary commodities, have 
broken into the global market for manufacturing and services, thereby lowering their 
poverty. Second, efforts have been increased to include countries like Afghanistan and 
Congo into the world economy. Third, economic integration results in a standardization 
or cultural and institutional homogenization. In sum, economic integration has 
supported poverty reduction efforts, but inclusion should be improved so as not to 
bypass marginalized and new globalizing countries (see also Dollar and Collier 2001; 
and Khan and Riskin 2001). The World Bank Development Research Group presents a 
seven-point plan to help developing countries take greater advantage of the benefits of 
globalization, and to manage the risks associated with their integration into the world 
economy.3 
                                                 
3  The seven-point plan includes: (i) a ‘development round’ of trade talks to bring down the trade 
barriers, (ii) improving the investment climate in developing countries to encourage inflows of FDI, 
(iii) improving delivery of education and health services to enable the poor to benefit from growth, 
(iv) providing social protection to a changing labour market to enable workers to take more risks and 
to avail themselves of new opportunities, (v) rich nations to increase foreign aid with impact on 
growth and poverty, (vi) supporting debt relief for reforms in marginalized countries, and 
(vii) tackling greenhouse gases which have been burdensome to poor countries and poor people.     
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Yusuf (2003) lists a number of factors that are relevant as a source of growth to both 
poor and rich countries. These are labour, human capital, research and development 
investment, technological progress and the increase in total factor productivity resulting 
from scale economies, agglomeration effects, externalities, as well as institutions that 
secure rights and minimize transaction costs. Increased welfare in developing countries 
will depend on their policies addressing these variables. Concerning globalization in 
Africa, Ajayi (2003) reaches the conclusion that integration into the global economy 
alone does not enhance growth. Integration must be combined with the maintenance of 
macroeconomic stability, high investment/GDP ratios and the development of human 
capital, infrastructure and institutions. Mussa (2003), giving an overview of the 
challenges faced by the international community because of globalization, emphasizes 
economic issues related to the distribution of benefits accruing from increased trade and 
the reduction of the effects of instability in international capital flows. 
2.3  Different perspectives on globalization and measures to reduce 
its negative effects 
Globalization has other dimensions than just inequality and poverty. These produce 
different impacts and can be looked at from different perspectives. James (2002) 
analyses the causes of globalization in terms of transaction costs. He focuses on the 
information and communication technologies as well as technical change and foreign 
investment that derives from globalization and their application to Africa. Bhagwati 
(2000) focuses on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) and suggests that 
appropriate governance is needed to manage globalization and the speed at which it 
must be pursued. La Porta et al.’s (1999) examination shows that from the perspective 
of promoting development, the performance and quality of governance across countries 
vary systematically. Milanovic (2002) shows that the effects of openness on income 
distribution depend on a country’s initial income level. Seshanna and Decornez (2003) 
note that during the last 40 years the world economy has become wealthier, more 
globally integrated, but also more unequal and polarized. Mahler (2001) finds little 
evidence of a systematic relationship between any of the three main modes of economic 
globalization (trade, FDI and financial openness) and either the distribution of 
disposable income or earnings of households in developed countries.  
Several studies address the wage links between globalization and inequality within a 
country. The effects of globalization on skill premium, unemployment, and the social 
policies of countries are addressed by Ethier (2002). Empirical literature concludes that 
in the rise of skill premium, trade has played a smaller role than skill-biased technical 
change. On the basis declining relative wages of unskilled workers in the US since the 
late 1970s, Miller (2001) demonstrates that globalization accounts for a significant 
increase in earnings inequality. Eckel (2003) shows that changes in relative wages are 
independent of wage rigidities, but wage inequality is affected by capital market 
integration. Manasse and Turrini (2001) study the effects of globalization on income 
inequality by looking at trade integration. Globalization, although improving welfare, is 
likely to raise inequality. Redistribution, rather than protection, should be the 
appropriate measure to avoid a rise in inequality. In line with Sen (2002), Ravallion 
(2003) is concerned about the continuing deprivation and rising disparity in standards of 
living.     
Countries need a number of measures to reduce the negative impact of the rapid 
globalization process, but the current system is incapable of dealing with the surfacing 
problems. Nayyar and Court (2002) identify ways in which the governance needs of the 
world economy and policy can be strengthened. A new structure of governance, reforms 
and new institutions are proposed to protect better the interests of the poorer developing 
countries. Addison and Rahman (2002) identify the geographical characteristics, 
institutional and political factors, economic policy and history that can influence an 
individual country’s capacity to globalize. Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin (1999) 
conclude that commercial and financial integration was more limited before the First 
World War but that trade tensions and financial instability have not worsened in recent 
years; thanks to institutional innovations and their stabilizing role. However, on the 
issue of the importance of institutional capacity for globalization and openness 
Chirathivat and Murshed (2001) argue that the domestic institutional capacities of 
Southeast Asia were inadequate to prevent the 1997/98 Asian economic crisis.  
There is a link between exports and inequality. Calderón and Chong (2001) find that an 
increase in inequality is associated with the primary export countries (developing 
nations), while a decreasing inequality is linked to manufacturing exporters (developed 
countries). Despite increased inequality, Mayer (2001) finds that globalization has 
improved access to new technologies and provides unique opportunities for poor 
countries to raise their incomes, but that countries differ in technology upgrading and 
skill accumulation (see also Meyer 1999). Despite the limitations of the existing 
literature, a majority of empirical studies conclude that the positive impacts of 
integration outweigh its negative effects.  
3  A composite globalization index 
Kearney (2002, 2003) is the first attempt to construct a database and to compute a 
composite globalization index. The index is composed of four major components: 
economic integration, personal contact, technology, and political engagement, each 
generated from a number of determinant variables, 13 in total. The globalization index 
(hereafter denoted as KEARNEY) is based on the normalization of individual variables 
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where i and t indicate country and time periods, m and j are within and between major 
component variables,  jm ω  are the weights attached to each variable, min and max are 
minimum and maximum values of respective variables across countries in a given year. 
The index is similar to the commonly used human development index (HDI) which is 
based on educational attainment, life expectancy and real GDP per capita.4  
In the calculation of the Kearney index, the component’s weights are chosen on an ad 
hoc basis and are constant across countries and over time. We consider this index to be 
a benchmark index. In the basic index, each of the 13 determinants of the index is given 
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Noorbakhsh (1998).  
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equal weight (w=1). In the alternative case, a number of variables are given double 
weights (w=2). Using a smaller set of countries, Lockwood (2001) finds the ranking of 
countries to be sensitive to the way the indicators are measured, normalized and 
weighted.   
There are two alternative approaches to the Kearney index for computing an index of 
globalization; using the principal component (Heshmati 2003) or factor analysis 
(Andersen and Herbertsson 2003).5 In this paper we adopt the principal component (PC) 
approach.6 PC analysis is a multivariate technique for examining relationships within a 
set of variables consisting of several quantitative variables. Recently, Agénor (2003) 
used trade and financial openness to compute a simple economic globalization index 
based on PC analysis. 
Given a dataset with p numeric variables, at most p principal components can be 
computed; each is a linear combination of the original variables with coefficients equal 
to the eigenvectors of the correlation of the covariance matrix. The principal 
components are sorted according to the descending order of the eigenvalues, which are 
equal to the variance of the components. PC analysis can be viewed as a way to uncover 
approximate linear dependencies among variables. This method gives a least square 
solution to the following model: 
E XB Y + =  (2) 
where Y is an  p n×  matrix of the centred observed variables, X is the  j n×  matrix of 
scores of the first j principal components, B is a  p j×  matrix of eigenvectors, E is an 
p n×  matrix of residuals, n is the number of observations, p the number of partial 
variables, and j the number of variables or indicators of globalization. Here we 
minimize the sum of all the squared residuals, which are measured as distances from the 
point to the (first) principal axis. In the least squares case, the vertical distance to the 
fitted line is minimized.  
The globalization indices indicate the level and progress of globalization for different 
countries over time. A breakdown of the index into major components provides the 
possibility to identify the sources of globalization, to quantify their impact on the 
integration of countries, and the index can be used to study the causal relationship 
between globalization, income inequality and poverty.  
 
                                                 
5  The data underlying the two studies differ with respect to country coverage, period of observation and 
selected indicators of globalization. Heshmati (2003) is based on a panel data containing 13 indicators 
of globalization and 62 industrialized and developing countries observed during 1995-2000, while 
Anderson and Herbertsson (2003) use data on 9 indicators from 23 OECD countries for the period 
1979 to 2000. 
6  A PC procedure produces standardized or unstandardized PC scores. A factor analysis (FA) produces 
the same results as PC except that scoring coefficients from FA are normalized to give PC scores with 
unit variance. For a discussion of each method’s advantages over the other, see SAS/STAT Users’ 
Guide (SAS Institute 1993).   
4 The  data 
The database created by Kearney/Foreign Policy magazine (2002, 2003)7 is used for the 
computation of the globalization index. These data constitute a small balanced panel 
covering 62 countries observed for the period 1995-2000, and were originally collected 
from national sources, international organizations and financial institutions. The data 
variables on economic integration, personal contacts, technology, and political 
engagement are expected to proxy the channels through which globalization affects 
economic growth, inequality and the poverty of nations.  
The data on economic integration consist of four variables: trade, FDI, portfolio capital 
flows, and income payments and receipts. All four variables are given as a share of 
GDP. The trade variable includes total trade and is measured as the sum of trade of 
goods and services. FDI is measured as an aggregate of in- and outflows of FDI. 
Portfolio flows are measured as the sum of portfolio inflows and outflows. Income 
payments and receipts include the compensation of non-resident employees and income 
earned and paid on assets held abroad. 
The second component for personal contact consists of three variables: international 
telephone traffic, international travel and tourism, and transfer of payments and receipts. 
The variable for telephone traffic is defined as the per capita sum of incoming and 
outgoing calls. The variable for travel and tourism is defined as the share of travellers 
entering and leaving a country in relation to its population. The variable for transfers 
and payments is measured as the total of in- and out-transfer payments as a share of 
GDP.  
The technology component builds on three variables: internet users, internet hosts and 
secure internet servers. This component is very much communication specific and is 
inadequate to reflect technology in a broad sense. The internet user variable is measured 
as a share of population, while internet hosts and secured servers are measured per 
capita.  
The last component, political engagement, is based on three variables which include the 
number of embassies in a country, the number of memberships in international 
organizations, and the number of UN Security Council missions undertaken during a 
calendar year.  
The supplementary data include population and GDP variables used for normalization 
purposes. For summary statistics of the variables, see Table 1, where we can observe 
large variations in the variables underlying the calculation of the index and its 
components. The distribution of the index components (not reported here) is not 
uniform. This is particularly evident in the case of the technology component which 
indicates large dispersion and with the sample mean significantly higher than the 
median. In the case of the political component, the mean and median values overlap. 
The range of principal component-based indices differs from those of Kearney-based 
indices.  
Correlation coefficients among the various index components are presented in Table 2. 
As expected, the various components are positively and mostly significantly correlated 
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among themselves. The economic integration component is negatively correlated over 
time, while technology is positively correlated with time. The remaining personal and 
political components as well as the two Kearney globalization indices are not correlated 
with time.  
The economic integration consists of four variables, defined largely by trade and capital 
flows. There was a major East Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 and a crisis in the 
emerging Russian and Brazilian markets in 1998. These resulted in a major decline in 
capital flows to the emerging-market countries as well as high volatility in the East 
Asian financial markets. This could well explain the negative correlation between 
economic integration and time trend.8    
The application of different weights does not change the rank of the countries much. 
The overall Kearney index is dominated by political and economic integration. We have 
not decomposed the principal component index into its underlying four components. 
Such decomposition would require, first, the application of PC analysis on each 
component separately, and then the aggregation of the components into a single 
globalization index by assigning some weights to each component, or, alternatively, the 
use of canonical correlation analysis looking at the correlation relationship between two 
or more sets of variables.  
5  Variations in the globalization index 
The Kearney and principal component indices of globalization are computed for each of 
the 62 countries and for six years of observation. A weighted principal component index 
is obtained by aggregating the first three principal components, where in the 
aggregation their normalized contribution to the explanation of the total variance is used 
as weight.9 Following Kearney’s approach a number of economic, personal and 
technology factors are given higher weights. For a sensitivity analysis, the Kearney 
index as a benchmark model is computed with equal weights as well. The summary 
statistics of the index components are given at the bottom of Table 1.  
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients for the different indices and their 
components. The economic component is decreasing (-0.14) over time, while 
technology shows an increasing trend (0.12). The personal and economic components 
are highly correlated (0.59). Unlike the Kearney indices, the first (PC1) and weighted 
first three principal component (PCW) indices indicate that the globalization process is 
increasing over time (0.24 and 0.29, respectively). The within-group correlation among 
the two Kearney indices is high (0.99), as well as among the two PC indices (0.84). The 
between index group correlation coefficients are also quite high (0.77-0.88). The 
numbers in parenthesis are the respective correlation coefficients. 
                                                 
8   I thank Carol Graham for making this point. 
9  For the principal component analysis we identified three eigenvalues exceeding one; 4.5862, 2.6419 
and 1.3622. The proportions of the total variance explained by these principal components are: 
0.3528, 0.2032 and 0.1048. The cumulative proportion of total variance explained is 0.6608.   
4.1  Ranking countries by the level of globalization 
The mean of the four globalization indices by country, together with the period mean 
Gini coefficient and most recent years of Gini coefficient, is reported in Table 3A. The 
countries are ranked in the descending order of the first principal component index. 
However, for comparison, the rank numbers by the weighted Kearney index are also 
given in the same table. The rank of countries according to the degree of globalization 
differs somewhat, depending on the computation method chosen. The ranking position 
of the least globalized countries is higher than that of the most globalized ones.  
The results based on the first principal component show that Uganda, Iran and Morocco 
rank as the three least globalized countries versus Ireland, Singapore and Switzerland 
which are ranked as the most advanced in terms of globalization. Slovenia, Slovak 
Republic and Nigeria are among the average with regard to globalization. Internal and 
external conflicts seem effectively to reduce the globalization process of the low 
ranking countries by affecting their economic and technology components negatively. 
With few exceptions, the high ranking countries share similar patterns in the distribution 
of the various components, but several exceptions can be noted. Russia is allocated a 
very high political factor which crucially affects its rank (34) and France, ranked 15, 
also has the highest political factor. The same is true in the case of China which, despite 
its high political engagement, is ranked only 44. The mean unweighted Kearney index 
decomposed into sub-components by country is given in Figure 1. The mean of each of 
the four indices by country is shown in Figure 2. The position of the countries, with the 
exception of the weighted principal component index, is very similar. The difference in 
the latter is due to normalization prior to aggregation of the three principal components. 
The three principal components are shifted so that the minimum values are 0 and the 
sum of variances used as weights in the aggregation adds up to 1.  
4.2  Ranking regions by the degree of globalization 
The mean level of globalization by regions is presented in Table 3B and Figure 4. The 
ranking of regions differs depending on whether an identical or different weighting 
system for the Kearney index is applied, or whether only the first principal component 
or a weighted index of the first three principal components is used. As a result of 
attaching a higher weight to the technology factor, Latin America, with a relatively low 
technology component, shifts its position to a lower rank in the favour of East Asia. 
Based on equal weights, the South Asian region is identified as the least advanced in 
terms of globalization, and its low level of globalization is very much determined by the 
absence of the technology factor. This picture is shared by the Sub-Saharan African and 
Middle East and North African regions. The ranking based on the first principal 
component is close to that of the Kearney-based weighted index.  
The East Europe and East Asia regions are identified as the medium level of 
globalization. However, the two regions differ according to index components. For 
instance, East Asian region has the advantage in technology transfer, while Eastern 
Europe enjoys better personal contacts. In terms of political engagements they are also 
different. The East Asian region shows high economic integration and technology 
transfer, but its level of globalization is limited by relatively low personal contacts and 
political engagements. The East European region shows progress in all four factors, but  
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yet it has relatively low technology transfer. West Europe10 and Southeast Asia 
constitute the highest globalized economic and geographic regions. Economic 
integration for the Southeast Asian region is higher, while the remaining three 
components are higher in Western Europe. There is large heterogeneity in the 
globalization process of the countries belonging to these two regions.   
4.3  The development of globalization over time 
The mean indices and their components (based on the unweighted Kearney index) for 
each year of observation from 1995 to 2000 are reported in Table 3C and Figure 3. 
Ideally this should be weighted by the countries’ share of GDP or population to provide 
a more accurate picture of the temporal changes in the globalization process. Despite the 
short period, yet it does provide a partial picture of the development of globalization. In 
terms of total GDP, size of population and total volume of trade, the small sample 
provides a satisfactory survey of the coverage of globalization.  
Unweighted economic integration increased during 1995-97 from 0.73 to 0.86. It 
declined sharply to 0.60 in 1998 and remained below this level until 2000. The decline 
is a consequence of the emerging markets and the East Asian financial crisis. The two 
principal component indices continuously increased over time. These are preferred as 
they are not restricted by assumption of the same weights or arbitrarily chosen weights. 
The technology component continuously increased from 0.27 to 0.44. The political 
component is constant over time and as expected it does not change over a short period. 
The average annual changes in index components and composite indices are reported in 
Table 3D. Here the changes are based on annual means, neglecting the between-country 
variation. The between-country variation is quite high as a share of the total variation. 
Due to the increasing patterns of the technology component and the principal 
component indices over time, their percentage changes over time are all positive.  
4.4  A comparison to previous results 
A number of factors distinguish this study from previous ones. First, unlike previous 
studies which are often based on trade only to proxy globalization, our analysis is based 
on a general index of globalization that covers various aspects of changes in 
international economy, technology transfer and in world politics. Thus, it captures better 
the free movement of goods, services, technology, labour, capital and politics across 
borders and over time, that result from lower transportation cost, lower trade barriers, 
faster communication technologies, competition and standardizations. Second, the time 
period is very short and covers only the last years of the second wave of globalization. 
Third, the number of countries is limited by data availability.  
Despite the limitations of country and time coverage, our results provide a clear picture 
of the heterogeneity in the process of globalization during its recent revival phase, 
disparity in development and its possible impacts on rising inequality between and 
within countries and regions over time. Before turning to the regression analysis, we 
                                                 
10 In order to reduce the number of regions we have pooled Australia, New Zealand, USA and Canada to 
the West European region and label the group as industrialized countries.  
note that in some studies there are indications that globalization has reduced poverty in 
several integrated economies through faster growth. In our sample and period, there is a 
pattern of globalized countries having experienced high growth and reduced poverty. 
But, inequality can also be linked to poor governance, infrastructure and institutions, 
and taxes and redistribution policies in lagging countries rather than to fast growth and 
their degree of globalization.   
6  The impacts of globalization on income inequality 
6.1  Specification of the relationship 
Income inequality from a country perspective may depend on a number of internal and 
external factors. Globalization is one such main external factor. The link between 
globalization, income inequality and growth has been the focus of much research 
attention for years. However, with the exception of a partial view in studies like Mahler 
(2001) and Agénor (2003) who looked at the relationship between inequality and the 
economic components of globalization (trade, FDI and financial openness), the lack of a 
globalization index has not allowed the relationship to be statistically estimated and 




ji j i i u REGION GINDEX GINI + + + = ∑
=1
1 0 γ α α  (3) 
where GINI and GINDEX refer to the Gini coefficient and globalization index, REGION 
is a J vector of regional dummies, u an error term and the subscript i refers to a country. 
Since the two datasets (Kearney and World Income Inequality Database, WIID), do not 
fully overlap, we are forced to use a cross-sectional approach as a second best 
alternative in establishing the inequality-globalization relationship. The Kearney 
database covers the period 1995-2000, while the WIID covers the period before 1998. 
The former is a balanced panel data of 62 countries, while in the latter 146 countries are 
observed non-consecutively on an irregular basis.  
The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of income inequality obtained from WIID. It 
is given as a mean of multiple observations for a given country in a given year. The 
multiplicity of observations is due to the different definitions of income, area coverage 
and units of measurement. It is defined here in two different ways. First, the most recent 
observation (1996 to 1998) is used in the cross-sectional regression analysis. A number 
of countries (16) are observed prior to 1995. For the second definition instead of the last 
year of observation, we use the mean Gini by country for all years that a country is 
observed. For summary statistics of the inequality variables see Table 1.  
The globalization index is defined in four ways: the unweighted and weighted Kearney 
and principal component indices. In the unweighted Kearney case, all 13 indicators are 
given identical weights (w=1). In order to avoid the strong assumption of equal weights, 
a number of factors in the weighted Kearney case are given double weights (w=2) on an 
ad hoc basis. The unequally weighted factors are FDI, portfolio investment, 
international telephone traffic, and internet users. The unweighted principal component 
index is based on the first principal component of the same 13 indicators, while the 
weighted index is based on the weighted average of the first three principal components.   
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6.3  Correlation between globalization, inequality, and poverty 
Correlation among the different unweighted components of the Kearney globalization 
index, and the different aggregate globalization indices are reported in Table 4. 
Calculations here are based on cross-sectional data obtained as multiple period means to 
be used in the regression analysis. The correlation coefficients and their significance are 
very similar to those based on non-averaged individual observation reported in Table 2. 
All coefficients are positive and significantly different from zero indicating a positive 
within- and between-group correlation among the indices and their decomposition. An 
exception is insignificant correlation of the political component with the economic and 
personal components. In general the correlation among the aggregate indices is stronger 
(0.82 to 0.99) than the correlation among the disaggregated four index components 
(0.35 to 0.65). The correlation between the components of the two groups varies in the 
interval of 0.33 to 0.85.  
The correlation between globalization, income inequality, and poverty indices, based on 
the over time mean values, is also reported in Table 4. The two Gini coefficients are 
highly correlated with each other (0.84). They are negatively correlated (-0.27 to -0.37) 
with the personal and technology components, negatively and weakly correlated with 
political component but uncorrelated with the economic component. The same negative 
but statistically significant relationship holds between inequality and the aggregate 
globalization indices (-0.28 to -0.33).  
The poverty measures representing the percentage of the population below the national 
poverty line of below US$1 and below US$2 per day, are positively correlated with 
each other (0.45 to 0.83). However, none of these three measures are correlated with the 
fourth measure which is based on the share of the poor in the lowest 20 per cent of 
national income or consumption. The first three poverty measures are uncorrelated with 
inequality, while the last measure is negatively correlated (-0.76 to -0.85). Increased 
inequality is more damaging to the poorest 20 per cent of the population. Regarding the 
correlation between our four poverty measures and four globalization indices, the results 
show that globalization reduces poverty (-0.31 to -0.50) and increases (0.22 to 0.23) the 
share of the poorest 20 per cent of the national income or consumption, thereby also 
reducing inequality. The declining poverty is mostly associated with the technology and 
personal components of globalization. For more details see Table 4.   
6.3 Estimation  results 
The estimation results from a regression of the Gini coefficient on the unweighted 
Kearney globalization index, when Gini is defined as the most recent year of 
observation, are reported in Table 5A. Results based on an alternative definition where 
Gini is defined as mean income inequality over time are reported in Table 5B. 
Regression results from the two Gini measures on the unweighted (first) principal 
component measure of globalization are presented in Table 5C. Results based on 
weighted first three principal components are not reported here due to limited space. 
It is worth mentioning that, since we use cross-sectional regression analysis, it has not 
been possible to identify the unobservable country-specific effects. However, in 
addition to the globalization index we have added a number of dummy variables to 
represent the unobservable regional effects. These capture regional heterogeneity in 
income inequality.   
For sensitivity analysis, a number of alternative specifications of the simple relationship 
(equation 3) are estimated. In the basic model in Table 5A (Model A1) the 
between-country variations in income inequality are explained by an aggregate 
unweighted Kearney globalization index. The coefficient is negative and statistically 
highly significant. It indicates a negative relationship between the level of globalization 
and income inequality. The same relationship applies when globalization is differently 
weighted (Model A9). However, globalization explains only 11 per cent of the 
variations in income inequality among the 60 countries.11 This is in line with Lindert 
and Williamson (2001) who find the net impact of globalization to be too small to 
explain the long-term rise in world inequality. The inclusion of the squared 
globalization indices in Models A1 and A9 was insignificant, indicating the absence of 
Kuznets U-shaped relationship between inequality and globalization. 
Results from a decomposition of the unweighted Kearney globalization index into its 
four sub-components (Model A2 to A5 of Table 5A) show that economic integration 
and political engagement individually do not explain any of the variations in income 
inequality.12 However, simultaneous inclusion of the four components (Model A6) 
indicates that personal contacts and technology transfers reduce inequality, while 
economic integration increases inequality. Political engagement is found to have no 
significant effect. Personal contact is the single component that contributes the most to 
the explanation of inequality variations as well as to its reduction. To control for 
regional heterogeneity, we add a number of regional dummies. Accounting for regional 
heterogeneity (Model A7) captures most variations in inequality among the countries. 
The explanatory power of the model increases from 0.11 to 0.64. Similar results are 
obtained when the weighted globalization index is used (Model A10). However, the 
weighted globalization index turns out to be insignificant. It should be noted that there 
is a risk that regional inequality and globalization are correlated biasing the effects of 
globalization on income inequality. This applies as well to the case where both sub-
components of globalization and regional effects are included (Model A8).   
Regression results corresponding to Models A1 to A8, based on alternative definitions 
of income inequality, where the mean Gini coefficient over time is used, are reported in 
Table 5B and labelled as Models B1 to B8. The signs of coefficients, compared to the 
previous case where Gini coefficient is from the most recently observed years, do not 
change. However, their significance and size change in a number of cases. The regional 
variables play an even more important role in the explanation of variation in income 
inequality.  
In Table 5C we present regression results on the link between income inequality defined 
in two different ways and globalization computed using the first principal component 
method. As in the previous cases the results indicate a negative relationship between 
globalization and income inequality. The squared globalization index is positive and 
weakly significant (Models C2 and C5) indicating a U-shaped or declining negative 
relationship. The fit of the model is somewhat lower compared to the two Kearney 
                                                 
11 The income inequality variables for South Africa and Morocco are missing. These two countries are 
excluded from the regression analysis.   
12 Agénor (2003) finds an inverted U-shape relationship between globalization and poverty. The 
globalization index was based on trade and financial integration. The index is similar to our economic 
integration component.   
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based indices. Adding regional dummies to the relation (Models C3 and C6) produces 
similar results in terms of signs, significance and the size of effects. Again the 
globalization index turns out to be statistically insignificant when regional dummies are 
added to the model.  
The results above suggest that the construction of the index and its decomposition are 
useful, although very little of the variance in inequality is explained by globalization 
operating through these four channels. Due to the cross-section nature of the data, we 
have not been able to control for country effects. However, what happens at country 
level across various channels is important. For instance, within-country factors such as 
institutions and governance structure seem to explain the differences in the outcome. 
Therefore, initial endowment and a country’s integration determine the distributional 
effects of globalization. The aggregate Gini coefficient fails to capture many 
distributional shifts that result from the opening of trade and capital markets. More 
disaggregated measures are needed to account for the distributional shifts within and 
between different population subgroups and regions. Furthermore, the current data and 
study cannot distinguish between the effects from technology, trade or such 
demographic trends as the increased number of two high-skilled breadwinners and 
single-headed low-wage earner at the top and bottom of the distribution scale. As 
suggested by Graham (2005) and Nissanke and Thorbecke (2005), it is important to 
conduct empirical studies towards understanding better the globalization-inequality-
poverty nexus in a country-specific context. 
Our results are in line with Mahler (2001). Using the Luxembourg Income Study 
database, Mahler finds little evidence of a systematic relationship between the three 
main modes of economic globalization, namely trade, outbound investment and 
financial openness and either the distribution of disposable personal income or earnings 
of households. The overall conclusion is that economic integration does not 
systematically lead to increased income inequality across entire economies.  
It is to be noted that the results presented here are primary. The results provide some 
initial support to the hypothesis of the existence of a (negative) relationship between 
inequality and globalization, but several essential improvements are still needed to 
confirm this finding.  
6.4  Guidelines to construct a modified index  
The index should take an axiomatic approach that sets out its desirable properties and 
provides a family of indexes that fulfil such properties. The index should fully quantify 
globalization by including several other relevant components. These could include some 
measure of cost-benefit ratio of globalization, impacts on standards of living, 
environmental aspects, wage inequality, skill biased technological change, the volume 
and direction of foreign trade and movements of skilled labour, and democracy and 
conflict, shift in power and aspects of cultural uniformity.  
The direction of causality, simultaneity and bias due to omitted effects must be 
investigated. Non-linearity would also shed more light on the Kuznets inverted 
U-hypothesis on the inequality-globalization relationship that is conditional on growth. 
Industrialized countries dominate the current sample, having different relationships 
between development, redistribution and inequality than the developing countries. The  
over-weighting of the advanced industrial countries in the sample results in smaller and 
slow changes in the mean globalization over time. It negatively biases the overall effects 
of globalization on inequality and poverty. Furthermore, it also biases the composition 
of the effects from a developing country perspective. The sample of countries should be 
expanded to include more developing and transition economies.  
The identification of the major determinants of globalization and the quantification of 
the effects on the ranking of countries are key issues forming the basis on which policy 
options can be provided. Analysis will help to identify ways to initiate fair treatment of 
products, services and people that would enable poor countries to benefit from 
globalization to a greater extent. To reduce the negative effects on inequality and the 
poor from openness and globalization, these need to be accompanied by redistribution 
policies and an improvement in social protection.  
7  The impacts of globalization on poverty 
7.1  Model specification  
The relationship between globalization and poverty is examined in several studies. 
Cornia and Court (2001) find that rising inequality threatens growth and poverty 
reduction targets, and persistent poverty at high levels makes poverty reduction 
difficult. Results in Agénor (2003) suggest that globalization at a low level hurts the 
poor, but at higher levels it reduces poverty. Ravallion (2003) sees the reduction of 
inequalities through opportunities within the developing countries as crucial for 
realizing globalization’s potential for poverty alleviation. Globalization is one external 
factor that might affect earnings as well as the distribution of income and poverty. In 
this section we aim to address the link between globalization and poverty by the means 




ji j i i v REGION GINDEX POVERTY + + + = ∑
=1
1 0 η λ λ  (4) 
where GINDEX refers to globalization index, REGION is a vector of regional dummies, 
v an error term and the subscript i refers to a country.  
The poverty data are prepared by the World Bank’s Development Research Group and 
Human Development Report 2003. The POVERTY variable is defined in four different 
ways: per cent of the population below the national poverty line, per cent of the 
population with income below US$1.08 and US$2.15 per day at 1993 international 
prices,13 and share of the poorest 20 per cent of national income or consumption from 
1990-2001. National estimates of poverty line are based on population weighted 
subgroup estimates from household surveys.  
To conserve space, the globalization index chosen is the unweighted Kearney index 
defined previously. Information on the national poverty line is available only for 29 
developing and transition countries included in the globalization database, and for 38 
countries we have information on the share of population with income below US$1 and 
                                                 
13 This is equivalent to $1 and $2 in 1985 prices, adjusted for purchasing power parity.  
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US$2 per day. The observation period mainly covers 1993-2000, with a few exceptions 
dating back to 1989. Information on the share of the poorest 20 per cent of national 
income or consumption is available for 59 countries.14 As the Bank does not provide 
data on poverty in industrialized countries, these are excluded from the poverty 
regression analysis.15  
7.3 Estimation  results 
The estimation results from a regression of the poverty on the unweighted Kearney 
globalization index are reported in Table  6. For a sensitivity analysis, a number of 
alternative specifications of the relation in equation 4 are estimated. In the basic model 
(Model C1) variations in poverty defined as the per cent of the population below the 
poverty line are explained by the aggregate unweighted Kearney globalization index. 
The coefficient is negative and statistically weakly significant. Globalization explains at 
most only 9 per cent of the variations in poverty among the countries, indicating a 
negative relationship between the level of globalization and poverty at the national 
level. The negative relationship holds even when poverty is measured as the share of 
poorest 20 per cent of national income or consumption. However, the relationship is not 
significantly different from zero when poverty is defined as income below US$1 (Model 
C3) or US$2 per day (C5). To control for regional heterogeneity, we add a number of 
regional dummies. Accounting for regional heterogeneity (Models C2, C4, C6 and C8) 
captures most variations in poverty among the countries. The explanatory power of the 
models increases to 0.53 in Model C8.  
In both inequality and poverty models, we have noted that when regional variations are 
controlled for, many of the globalization coefficients in the regression become 
insignificant. This suggests that the countries within each region are relatively 
homogenous, indicating the prevalence of variation among the regions. For instance, 
Africa has very high levels of poverty, low levels of technology and economic 
integration, while Latin America has the highest inequality level and high volatility in 
its short-term capital flows. The situation for South Asia in terms of globalization is 
similar to the one for Africa. This regional divergence in the patterns of globalization 
components will obviously determine how inequality and poverty are affected by the 
four components. The small sample size does not allow us to estimate the relationship 
for separate regions or allowing for parameter heterogeneity in the pooled model.  
Again the results presented here must be interpreted with cautious. With the exception 
of Models C7 and C8, the sample is very small and the periods when poverty and 
globalization are measured do not overlap in all cases. In Model C8 where the sample is 
the largest for the Middle East and North Africa regions, the poorest 20 per cent 
(Southeast Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa) have a significantly lower 
share of income relative to the reference group (East Europe). The shares of the East 
European countries are insignificantly different from that of the West Europe, an 
indication of no link existing between globalization and poverty when poverty for the 
                                                 
14 No data are available for Argentine, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan. 
15 Alternatively one could assign the minimum poverty rate of 2 per cent to the industrialized countries 
and instead of least squares apply tobit analysis to the censored data to establish the link between 
poverty and globalization.  
poorest is defined as the share of national income and consumption. As mentioned 
previously, several factors limit the comparability of this study with those found in the 
literature. The strength of the current study lies in the computation of a 
multidimensional index for globalization and the use of statistical methods to establish 
the relationship between globalization, inequality and poverty depending on regional 
location of countries. The main limitations are the short and partially overlapping time 
period, and the small number of countries included in our regression analysis.  
8 Summary 
This study addresses the measurement of two indices of globalization (Kearney and 
principal component analysis based) that quantify the level and development of 
globalization for ranking countries. The indices are composed of four main components: 
economic integration, personal contact, technology, and political engagements, each of 
which develops differently over time and across countries. Alternative weighted and 
unweighted versions of the two indices are also computed. 
The results show that internal and external conflicts seem to reduce effectively the 
globalization prospects of the countries. The low ranking position of the country is often 
associated with economic and technology factors which certain developing countries are 
unable to address. The high ranking countries share similar patterns in various 
component distributions. The mean globalization by region shows that personal and 
technology factors play an important role in determining the ranking position of the 
regions. This breakdown of the index into major components offers the possibility to 
identify the sources of globalization and link these to economic policy measures to 
bring about desirable changes in national and international policies.  
When looking at the simple correlation among the indices for income inequality, 
poverty and globalization, we find the Gini coefficients negatively correlated with 
disaggregated personal, technology and political components, but uncorrelated with the 
economic component. The same negative relationship exists between the income 
inequality and the aggregate globalization indices. We do not find correlation between 
the share of poor and inequality, but their share of income is negatively correlated with 
income inequality. This is interpreted as increased inequality being more damaging to 
the poorest population. Concerning correlation between poverty and globalization 
indices, results show that globalization reduces poverty and increases the income share 
of the poorest group, thus reducing inequality. The reduction in poverty is associated 
mostly with technology component of globalization.  
In a regression analysis we investigate the relationship between inequality, poverty and 
globalization. The results show that the globalization index explains only 7-11 per cent 
of the variations in income inequality, and 9 per cent of poverty among the countries. 
By decomposing the aggregate globalization index into four components, the results 
show that personal contacts and technology transfers reduce inequality, while economic 
integration increases inequality. Political engagement is found to have no significant 
effect on income inequality. The results provide weak evidence that globalization 
reduces poverty. When controlling for regional heterogeneity, we find that the regional 
variable plays an important role in explaining the variation in inequality and poverty, 
which makes the globalization coefficient insignificant. This suggests that the variations  
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among regions are a dominant factor in how poverty and inequality are affected by the 
four globalization components.  
Although the current version of the index quantifies the level of globalization well, it 
has certain limitations and the results should be interpreted with caution. We have 
introduced a number of improvements to overcome several of the shortcomings. These 
include an axiomatic approach to set out the desirable properties of the index, the use of 
panel data, identification and incorporation of more dimensions or components and the 
use of estimation methods that avoid the choice of weights attached to each index 
component on an ad hoc basis. These are important issues in understanding how 
globalization functions and learning to use the generated information in policy 
formulation and development evaluations. The index is in its early stage of development 
but has identified several directions along which future advances can be made. In order 
to make the regression results on the link between globalization, inequality and poverty 
more stable, less biased towards industrialized countries, and to cover different phases 
of globalization one should extend the data both in time and transition and developing 
country dimensions.  
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Summary statistics, globalization data, 1995-2000 
NT=62x6=372 observations 
Variable   Mean   Median   Std Dev   Minimum   Maximum 
A. Economic integration 
1. Trade (w=1)   0.777   0.6750   0.505   0.157   3.475 
2. Foreign direct investment (w=2)   0.043   0.0285   0.050   0.000   0.331 
3. Portfolio investment (w=2)   0.057   0.0229   0.150   0.000   1.669 
4. Income payments and receipts (w=1)  0.090   0.0604   0.099   0.005   0.782 
 
B. Personal contacts 
1. International telephone traffic (w=2)   97.432   44.245   128.910   0.900   707.460 
2. International travel & tourism (w=1)  0.806   0.348   1.056   0.003   6.361 
3. Transfer payments & receipts (w=1)   0.033   0.027   0.030   0.000   0.150 
 
C. Technology 
1. Internet users (w=2)   0.064   0.018   0.101   0.000   0.594 
2. Internet hosts (w=1)   0.013   0.002   0.027   0.000   0.295 
3. Secure internet servers (w=1)   0.011  0.001   0.029   0.000   0.283 
 
D. Political engagements 
1. Embassies in country (w=1)   71.613   68.500   34.197   13.000   172.000 
2. Membership in intl org. (w=1)   48.806   47.800   10.382   6.000   77.000 
3. Particip. in UNSC missions (w=1)    0.251   0.222   0.205   0.000   0.778 
 
E. Income inequality measures (n1=n2==60): 
1. Gini from most recent year   38.349   36.670   9.218   23.702   59.000  
2. Mean multiple period Gini   38.342   36.580   9.326   21.990   60.690 
 
F. Poverty measures (n1=29, n2=n3=38 and n4=59): 
1. % population below poverty line   28.348   28.600   14.281   4.600  64.000 
2. % population below US$1 per day   12.826   6.350   18.269   2.000   82.200 
3. % population below US$2 per day   31.853   24.050   27.997   2.000   96.400 
4. Share of 20% poorest of national income 
                and consumption  6.583   6.900   2.219   1.400   10.600   
 
G. Kearney globalization indices: 
1. Unweighted Kearney index (K)  2.980   2.437   1.420   1.069   7.978 
2. Weighted Kearney index  (KW)  3.646   2.825   2.035   1.168   11.055 
 
H. Principal component globalization indices: 
1. First principal component (PC1)  1.029   0.598   1.000   0.000   6.279 
2. Second principal component   4.279   4.375   1.000   0.000   8.832 
3. Third principal component   6.810   6.853   1.000   0.000   10.530 
4. Weighted first three PC (PCW) index  2.945   2.808  0.636   1.613   5.238  
Notes:  w = weights. UNSC United National Security Council.  
Source: Author’s  calculations.  
Table 2 
Pearson correlation coefficients, NT = 372. 
 Tech-   
 Year  Economic  Personal  nology  Political  K  KW  PCI  PCW 
Year 1.0000   
Economic -0.1380  1.0000 
 0.0076   
Personal 0.0399  0.5871  1.0000 
 0.4423  0.0001 
Technology    0.1150  0.2906 0.3446 1.0000 
 0.0265  0.0001  0.0001 
Political  0.0046  0.0312 0.0243 0.3952 1.0000 
  0.9282  0.5475 0.6403 0.0001   
K  0.0010  0.7119 0.6840 0.7576 0.5523 1.0000 
  0.9832  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
KW -0.0082  0.7630  0.6863  0.7550 0.4738 0.9909 1.0000 
  0.8746  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001   
PC1  0.2946  0.6395 0.6327 0.7127 0.3947 0.8774 0.8842 1.0000   
  0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
PCW  0.2314  0.3759 0.3313 0.6712 0.7975 0.8156 0.7840 0.8392  1.0000   
  0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000       
Notes:  K=unweighted Kearney index, KW=weighted Kearney index, PC1=unweighted (first) principal component 
index, PCW=weighted principal component index based on the first three principal components. p-values 
are given under the coefficients. 
Source: Author’s  calculations.  
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  1  Ireland    2.477 1.899 0.560 1.510 6.446    1 8.643 3.726 3.887  36.962 36.80 
  2  Singapore  2.729 1.551 0.920 0.734 5.935    2 8.575 3.181 3.197  38.115 42.49   
  3  Switzerland 1.545 1.746 0.999 1.689 5.979    3 8.137 3.050 3.996  33.100 33.20   
  4  Sweden  1.444 0.900 1.346 2.178 5.868    4 7.941 2.735 4.074  33.663 38.14   
  5  Netherlands 1.892 0.927 0.807 1.577 5.202    6 7.125 2.506 3.725  32.200 32.10   
  6  Canada  0.872 0.825 1.467 2.434 5.598    5 7.170 2.456 4.101  30.050 30.83   
  7  USA  0.436 0.275 2.400 2.531 5.641    8 6.739 2.391 4.299  40.425 38.65   
  8  Norway  0.874 0.836 1.699 1.685 5.094    7 6.881 2.289 3.615  39.422 30.74   
  9  Finland  0.790 0.731 1.752 1.818 5.091    9 6.586 2.260 3.682  31.500 29.33   
10  Denmark  1.242 1.000 0.903 1.925 5.069 10 6.529 2.228 3.666  35.525 34.04   
11  Austria  0.890 1.272 0.761 2.081 5.005 11 6.313 2.132 3.793  26.500 25.91   
12  UK  1.265 0.545 0.736 2.181 4.727 12 6.030 2.011 4.012  37.275 30.87   
13  New  Zealand  0.603 0.699 1.311 1.144 3.757 13 4.913 1.681 3.081  30.335 45.61   
14 Czech Rep.   0.833  1.281  0.225  1.410  3.749 18 4.346 1.620 3.254  23.900 23.22   
15  France  0.683 0.479 0.302 2.564 4.028 14 4.875 1.603 4.061  32.700 38.14   
16  Germany  0.712 0.472 0.513 1.960 3.657 16 4.631 1.477 3.679  31.787 31.67   
17  Australia  0.535 0.354 1.309 1.396 3.594 17 4.526 1.456 3.242  44.600 37.68   
18  Panama  1.943 0.322 0.039 0.642 2.947 22 3.725 1.224 2.508  52.034 49.22   
19  Portugal  0.883 1.008 0.335 1.404 3.630 15 4.641 1.199 2.990  35.600 36.26   
20  Hungary  0.898 0.690 0.165 1.283 3.036 23 3.650 1.183 3.000  25.300 24.61   
21  Malaysia  1.159 0.642 0.145 1.244 3.190 21 3.756 1.182 2.689  48.500 47.71   
22  Spain  0.635 0.676 0.297 1.530 3.139 20 3.850 1.132 3.214  23.702 30.93   
23  Italy  0.649 0.544 0.210 2.096 3.499 19 4.171 1.102 3.469  31.217 35.68   
24  Israel  0.547 0.999 0.536 0.764 2.847 24 3.566 0.927 2.487  38.200 32.70   
25  Poland  0.412 0.565 0.124 1.891 2.991 25 3.376 0.925 3.124  32.700 26.60   
26  Chile  0.784 0.197 0.106 1.124 2.211 29 2.879 0.763 2.779  55.516 50.93   
27  Japan  0.284 0.073 0.549 1.496 2.403 27 2.940 0.763 3.168  24.900 35.53   
28  Argentina  0.473 0.091 0.056 1.981 2.600 26 3.024 0.743 3.225  46.660 51.79   
29  Greece  0.223 0.861 0.154 1.278 2.515 28 2.919 0.697 2.807  32.700 41.56   
30  Slovenia  0.510 0.490 0.514 0.500 2.014 37 2.618 0.670 2.239  29.690 25.66   
31 Slovak Rep.   0.631  0.412  0.209  0.875  2.127 38 2.576 0.653 2.378  23.709 21.99   
32  Nigeria  0.617 0.305 0.001 1.653 2.576 32 2.781 0.618 2.804  50.300 43.20   
33  Croatia  0.547 0.873 0.111 0.594 2.125 34 2.727 0.608 2.242  30.067 25.68   
34  Russian  Fed.  0.322 0.090 0.032 2.168 2.613 30 2.801 0.585 3.190  39.575 34.14   
35 Korea Rep.   0.478  0.258  0.322  1.058  2.116 35 2.698 0.560 2.635  31.600 34.18   
36  Mexico  0.550 0.235 0.041 1.122 1.947 40 2.340 0.520 2.750  51.978 51.08   
37  Tunisia  0.441 0.507 0.005 1.288 2.241 39 2.407 0.510 2.598  40.410 44.92   
38  Botswana  0.811 1.153 0.017 0.477 2.458 36 2.659 0.504 1.966  52.302 53.90   
39  Venezuela  0.467 0.102 0.038 1.312 1.919 44 2.226 0.501 2.812  47.248 42.90   
40  Philippine  0.802 0.161 0.013 0.876 1.852 49 2.172 0.464 2.454  47.900 46.94   
41  Thailand  0.647 0.133 0.021 1.034 1.835 51 2.117 0.460 2.522  41.750 45.03   
42  Indonesia  0.451 0.069 0.006 1.492 2.018 47 2.195 0.456 2.759  35.270 36.36   
43  Egypt  0.242 0.496 0.005 1.904 2.647 33 2.747 0.447 2.946  28.900 33.72   
44  China  0.393 0.043 0.009 1.577 2.022 42 2.289 0.412 2.887  40.300 29.35   
45  Romania  0.345 0.303 0.044 1.207 1.899 50 2.128 0.404 2.623  36.378 26.38   
46  Brazil  0.258 0.045 0.059 1.464 1.825 53 2.078 0.400 2.887  58.846 54.99   
Table 3A continues  
Table 3A (con’t) 
























































































47 South Africa   0.507  0.123  0.145  0.985  1.759 45 2.215 0.393 2.607  59.000 54.89   
48  Taiwan  0.530 0.372 0.427 0.010 1.339 55 1.977 0.382 1.766  31.700 33.04   
49  India  0.166 0.215 0.004 1.697 2.082 46 2.208 0.362 2.898  35.457 34.55   
50  Turkey  0.260 0.278 0.036 1.301 1.875 54 2.026 0.362 2.696  45.625 49.21   
51  Pakistan  0.186 0.378 0.001 1.674 2.238 41 2.307 0.354 2.760  31.200 34.26   
52  Saudi  Arab.  0.518 0.959 0.009 0.979 2.464 31 2.799 0.347 2.308  –  –   
53  Senegal  0.350 0.535 0.003 1.263 2.151 43 2.279 0.344 2.483  41.300 49.96   
54  Colombia  0.347 0.133 0.031 0.962 1.472 59 1.770 0.297 2.592  57.100 51.79   
55  Ukraine  0.349 0.240 0.010 1.033 1.632 60 1.766 0.278 2.353  32.941 28.43   
56  Peru  0.342 0.159 0.021 0.899 1.422 61 1.668 0.274 2.527  49.006 49.46   
57  Bangladesh  0.076 0.414 0.000 1.609 2.099 52 2.116 0.260 2.595  38.800 37.68   
58  Kenya  0.196 0.495 0.003 1.459 2.153 48 2.173 0.255 2.511  51.000 60.69   
59  Sri  Lanka  0.406 0.597 0.006 0.721 1.730 56 1.872 0.178 2.138  34.400 40.40   
60  Morocco  0.234 0.599 0.003 0.953 1.789 57 1.841 0.166 2.313  –  – 
61  Iran  0.085 0.049 0.002 1.055 1.191 62 1.203 0.076 2.532  42.900 45.59   
62  Uganda  0.221 0.824 0.001 0.619 1.664 58 1.799 0.036 2.008  39.200 37.19   
Notes:  K=unweighted Kearney index, KW=weighted Kearney index, PC1=unweighted (first) principal component 
index, PCW=weighted principal component index based the first three principal components. Gini and 
mgini are the recent period and mean multiple period Gini coefficients. Rank 1 and Rank 2 are rank 
orders by PC1 and KW. 
Source:   Author’s calculations.  
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Table 3B 
Globalization index by region, ranked in descending order of the first principal component index, NT=372 
Region   Economic  Personal  Technology  Political    K   KW   PC1   PCW 
West Europe
1   0.982    0.845    0.940    1.841    4.607    5.927   2.007   3.652 
South East Asia   1.158    0.511    0.221    1.076    2.966    3.763   1.149   2.724 
East Europe   0.539    0.549    0.159    1.218    2.465    2.887   0.770   2.712 
Latin America   0.645     0.161    0.049    1.188    2.043    2.464   0.590   2.760 
East Asia   0.421    0.167    0.327    1.035    1.970    2.947   0.529   2.614 
Middle E&N Africa    0.374    0.640    0.099    1.198    2.311    2.564   0.460   2.558 
Sub-Saharan Africa    0.450    0.572   0.028    1.076    2.127    2.318   0.359   2.396 
South Asia    0.184    0.331    0.003    1.351    1.868    1.941   0.246   2.585 




Development of globalization index over time, NT=372 
Year   Economic     Personal   Technology   Political    K    KW   PC1   PCW 
1995    0.726    0.522     0.266    1.380    2.893    3.546  0.689   2.767 
1996    0.760    0.576    0.316    1.374    3.026    3.725   0.749   2.815 
1997    0.861    0.522    0.349    1.359    3.091    3.841  0.872   2.869 
1998    0.595    0.543    0.404    1.388    2.929    3.553   1.050   2.945 
1999    0.545    0.612    0.441    1.380    2.978    3.595   1.264   3.079 




Percentage change in globalization index over time, NT=372 
Year   Economic    Personal   Technology   Political    K   KW  PC1   PCW 
1995/6   10.07    18.80    63.45    -0.02    5.43   6.15   8.56   1.73 
1996/7   16.93    -8.05    31.21    -0.33    2.53   3.77   22.85   1.88 
1997/8    -28.19   3.27   55.97    2.20   -5.23    -7.17   18.18   2.40 
1998/9   -9.41   16.96    52.00     0.67   1.82   0.80   16.94   4.14 
1999/2000    9.06    -6.79    29.17    0.62   -0.55   0.41   21.32   3.32 
Notes:  K=unweighted Kearney index, KW=weighted Kearney index, PC1=unweighted (first) principal component 
index, PCW=weighted principal component index based the first three principal components.  





Pearson correlation coefficients, N=60 
  Economic  Personal  Technology  Political K KW PCI  PCW Gini mgini  PBPL  PB$1  PB$2  IS20 
economic 1.000   
personal 0.648  1.000   
 0.001   
technology 0.365  0.350  1.000   
 0.003  0.005   
political 0.039  0.024  0.407  1.000   
 0.762  0.851  0.001   
Kearney(K)    0.729  0.690 0.782 0.562 1.000   
 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001   
Kearneyw(KW)  0.774  0.698 0.786 0.487 0.992 1.000   
  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001   
princom1(PC1) 0.803  0.689  0.765 0.452 0.978 0.989 1.000   
  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001   
princomp(PCW) 0.444  0.332  0.689  0.852 0.859 0.828 0.820 1.000   
  0.001  0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001   
Gini  -0.065  -0.373 -0.267 -0.224 -0.326 -0.314 -0.302 -0.289  1.000   
  0.619  0.003 0.038 0.084 0.011 0.014 0.018 0.024   
mgini  -0.082  -0.298 -0.273 -0.208 -0.305 -0.298 -0.292 -0.279  0.841  1.000   
  0.530  0.020 0.034 0.110 0.017 0.020 0.023 0.030 0.001   
PBPL  -0.148  0.032 -0.302 -0.216 -0.314 -0.322 -0.329 -0.337  0.202  0.211  1.000   
  0.440  0.868 0.110 0.258 0.096 0.088 0.081 0.073 0.300 0.281   
PB$1  -0.210  0.056 -0.345  0.041 -0.135 -0.220  -0.323  -0.208 0.189 0.146 0.511 1.000   
  0.204  0.737 0.033 0.803 0.415 0.183 0.047 0.208 0.261 0.387 0.005   
PB$2  -0.369  -0.103 -0.574  0.206 -0.247 -0.392 -0.505  -0.184 0.117 0.162 0.455 0.831 1.000   
  0.022  0.537 0.001 0.212 0.133 0.014 0.001 0.266 0.490 0.335 0.014 0.001   
IS20  -0.037  0.262 0.239 0.214 0.234 0.216 0.195  0.199 -0.850 -0.760 -0.102 -0.093  0.019  1.000   
  0.777  0.044 0.067 0.102 0.074 0.099 0.137 0.129 0.001 0.001 0.604 0.578 0.908   
Notes:  p-values are given under the coefficients. K and KW are unweighted and weighted Kearney globalization indices. The PC1 and PCW are the unweighted (first) and weighted  (first 
three) principal component globalization indices. Gini and mgini are the recent period and mean multiple period Gini coefficients. PBPL is per cent population below national poverty 
line, PB$1 is per cent population below $1 per day, PB$1 is per cent population below $2 per day, and IS20 is share of 20 per cent poorest of national income or consumption. 






Least squares parameter estimates of the impact of the Kearney globalization index on the most recent years of income inequality (Gini) 
  Unweighted Kearney globalization index (K)    Weighted Kearney (KW)  
Explanatory variables  Model A1  Model A2  Model A3  Model A4  Model A5  Model A6  Model A7  Model A8    Model A9  Model A10 
Intercept 45.8642  * 37.5410  * 34.2443  * 34.9793  * 38.4699  * 33.4670  * 34.1586  * 32.4668  * 45.2898  * 39.4501  – 
Log K globalization index  -7.4923 *       –  -0.6478  ****  –  –  – 
Log KW globalization index            –  –  –  -6.9937 *  -3.4690   
Log economic integration    -1.2966 ****       3.7486 **  –  2.1313    –  – 
Log personal contact      -4.2817 *     -4.5780  * – -3.3735  * –  – 
Log  technology      -1.3914  *   -1.2066  ** –  0.9879    *** – – 
Log political engagement          -0.6328 ****  -0.4883 ****  –  0.3044 **** –  – 
Middle East & North Africa            –  4.6848 ****  9.3241 * –  3.4092  **** 
East Asia            –   0.7517 **** 0.1785 **** –  -5.8351 **** 
Southeast  Asia        –  8.7789  * 8.5782  * –  7.5161  ** 
South  Asia        –  2.7820      8.1049  ** –  0.8502  **** 
Latin  America        –  18.5843  * 17.5835  * –  13.2485  * 
Sub-Saharan  Africa        –  15.1725  * 21.0475  * –  12.7544  * 
East  Europe        –  -3.1218  ****  -1.0605  **** –  -9.1353  * 
Industrialized countries 
(reference) 
      –  –  –  –  – 
             
R-square  adjusted  0.1119  -0.0068 0.1804 0.0998  -0.0145    0.2274 0.6381 0.6834  0.0952 0.6870 
F-value 8.4300  * 0.6000  **** 13.9800  * 7.5400  * 0.1500  ****  5.3400  * 14.000  * 12.5800  * 7.2000  * 17.1900  * 
RMSE  8.6873 9.2495 8.3457 8.7460 9.2851 8.1027 5.5458 5.1870  8.7734 5.1599 
Number  of  observations  60 60 60 60 60 69 60 60    60 60 
Notes:  Significant at less than 1% (*), 1-5% (**), 5-10% (***), and greater than 10% (****) level of significance. The square of weighted and unweighted Kearney globalization indices in 
Models A1 and A9 are insignificant indicating absence of U-shaped relationship between inequality and globalization. RMSE is root mean square error. 








Least squares parameter estimates of the impacts of unweighted Kearney globalization index (K) on periods mean income inequality (mgini) 
Explanatory variables  Model B1  Model B2  Model B3  Model B4  Model B5  Model B6  Model B7  Model B8 
Intercept  45.3279* 37.0677* 35.1122  *  34.7682 *  38.4625 *  33.7618 *  40.4570 *  34.4889 * 
Log K globalization index  -6.9450 *          –  -3.9352****  – 
Log economic integration    -2.0444****        2.0001 **** –  -0.9609 **** 
Log personal contact      -3.3687 *      -2.8938 **  –  -1.5141 **** 
Log technology        -1.4755 *    -1.2950 **  –  0.5202 **** 
Log political engagement          -0.6325 **** -0.4388 **** –  -0.7727 **** 
Middle East & North Africa            –  3.0800 **** 5.6964 *** 
East  Asia        –  -5.9775  **** -5.7022  **** 
Southeast  Asia        –  7.0789  **  8.8086  * 
South  Asia        –  0.4034  **** 2.7974  **** 
Latin  America        –  12.5126  *  13.8832  * 
Sub-Saharan  Africa        –  12.5341  *  16.1924  * 
East  Europe        –  -10.7333  *  -8.8150  * 
Industrialized  countries  (reference)        –  –  – 
          
R-square  adjusted  0.0918 0.0082 0.1023 0.1114  -0.0146    0.1303 0.7129 0.7082 
F-value  6.9600 *  1.4900 **** 7.7200 *  8.4000 *  0.1500 **** 3.2100 **  19.3200 *  14.0200 * 
RMSE  8.8877 9.2877 8.8363 8.7912 9.3939 8.6974 4.9966 5.0377 
Number  of  observations  60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Notes:   Significant at less than 1% (*), 1-5% (**), 5-10% (***), and greater than 10% (****) level of significance. The square of the unweighted Kearney globalization  index (K) in Model B1 is 
insignificant indicating absence of U-shaped relationship between inequality and globalization. RMSE is root mean square error. 









Least squares parameter estimates of the impact of the first principal component globalization index (PC1) on income inequality  
  Dependent variable is last year’s Gini    Dependent variable is multiple period mean Gini 
Explanatory variables    Model C1  Model C2  Model C3    Model C4  Model C5  Model C6 
Intercept  41.6658 *  45.0123 *  32.9088 *  41.5862 *  45.3190 *  37.1401 * 
PC1 globalization index  -3.1456 **  -10.5145 **  0.2568 ****  -3.0770 **  -11.2968 **  -1.2632 **** 
Squared PC1 globalization Index  –  2.3479 ***  –    –  2.6190 ***  – 
Middle East & North Africa  –  –  5.4308 ****    –  –  3.7066 **** 
East Asia  –  –  1.7087 ****    –  –  -4.3802 **** 
Southeast Asia  –  –  9.3033 *    –  –  8.0168 * 
South Asia  –  –  3.7795 ****    –  –  1.6664 **** 
Latin America  –  –  19.4381 *    –  –  13.8757 * 
Sub-Saharan Africa  –  –  16.0495 *    –  –  13.2845 * 
East Europe  –  –  -2.4331 ****    –  –  -9.8667 * 
Industrialized  countries  (reference)  – – –    – – – 
          
R-square adjusted  0.0758  0.1030 0.6380  0.0697 0.1063 0.7053 
F-value  5.8400 **  4.3900 **  14.0000 *  5.4200 **  4.5100 **  18.6500 * 
RMSE  8.8622 8.7305 5.5466  8.9951 8.8166 5.0630 
Number  of  observations  60 60 60    60 60 60 
Note:  Significant at less than 1% (*), 1-5% (**), 5-10% (***), and greater than 10% (****) level of significance. 









Least squares parameter estimates of the impact of unweighted Kearney globalization index (K) on poverty 
  
% population below poverty line
  
% population below $1 per day 
  
% population below $2 per day 
  Share of 20% poorest of national 
income or consumption 
Explanatory variables  Model C1  Model C2    Model C3  Model C4    Model C5  Model C6    Model C7  Model C8 
Intercept  45.9115 *  42.8558 *    18.9551 *** 0.6690 ****   48.9832 *  12.4765 ****  5.2204 *  8.3772 * 
Log K globalization index  -23.4127 *** -20.7256 ***   -8.1328 **** 2.0192 ****   -22.7321 **** -1.6524 ****  -1.3508 **  0.1029 **** 
Middle East & North Africa  –  -12.1044 ****  –  0.0962 ****   –  8.3839 ****  –  -1.7002 ** 
East Asia  –  -23.6639 ***   –  8.1132 ****   –  16.5746 ****  –  -1.5520 **** 
Southeast Asia  –  -3.7445 **    –  4.2234 ****   –  19.6980 ****  –  -2.6117 * 
South Asia  –  5.8022 ****  –  18.5577 **    –  45.9763 *    –  -0.6390 **** 
Latin America  –  3.3624 ****  –  8.3663 ****   –  12.6077 ****  –  -5.4438 * 
Sub-Saharan Africa  –  13.7536 ***   –  36.5491 *    –  53.3331 *    –  -3.8369 * 
East Europe (reference)  –  –    –  -    –  –    –  – 
Industrialized countries (reference)  –  –    –  -    –  –    –  -1.1481 **** 
                  
R-square adjusted  0.0914    0.2979  -0.0153 0.3707  0.0138 0.4104  0.0540  0.5231 
F-value  3.8200 *** 2.7000 **  0.4400 **** 4.1100 *  1.5200 **** 4.6800 *  4.3100 **  8.9500 * 
RMSE  13.6133 11.9663  18.4079 14.4924 27.8032  21.4981  2.1579 1.5322 
Number  of  observations  29  29  38  38  38  38   59  59 
Note:   Significant at less than 1% (*), 1-5% (**), 5-10% (***), and greater than 10% (****) level of significance. RMSE is root mean square error. 
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